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Abstract: This paper investigates the factors affecting the choice between joint ventures and 
non-equity alliances, when firms enter foreign markets. Using a database of Italian firms 
compiled by the authors with 879 observations, we test the possible effects of firm specific 
characteristics, host country institutional characteristics and cultural distance on alliance 
mode choice. Using both transaction cost analysis and the resource based view, our findings 
demonstrate the crucial role played by firm size and by institutional and political features of 
host countries. The results concerning the role of functional activities involved and the 
industrial sector are mixed. Overall, our analysis shows that it is necessary to develop a more 
integrated approach to understand this complex choice made by firms when expanding 
abroad. 
 
Keywords: Market entry modes, Joint ventures;·Strategic alliances. 
 
 2 
1 Introduction 
 
In a context of globalisation of markets and competition, companies need to increase their 
international market presence. The choice of market entry mode is one of the most critical 
elements of a firm’s foreign investment strategy (Root, 1994; Kumar and Subramaniam 1997; 
Nakos and Brouthers 2002). When conquering foreign markets, firm frequently choose to 
establish alliances with local companies (Dunning 1995; Guidice and Mero 2007). Firms 
increasingly use this entry mode choice to access market and resources worldwide. Alliances 
can be defined as medium and long term agreements between companies, which involve the 
mutual transfer of intangible resources such as technology or human skills with or without the 
development of a dedicated administrative structure (Pisano 1989; Oxley 1997). Once firms 
have decided to expand internationally with a partner, they can use either the equity form 
(joint ventures) or a non-equity form (non-equity alliances).  
The objective of the present paper is to identify the factors that are likely to affect the choice 
between equity and non-equity agreements. The study empirically explores the determinants 
of the choice between joint ventures and non-equity agreements contributing to a field that is 
very important in terms of number of deals but that still requires further investigation 
(Globerman and Nielsen 2007). Using a database compiled by the authors for this specific 
purpose, covering both large and small- and medium-sized firms, we test some of the 
determinants affecting the alliance mode choice. The paper is organised in the following way. 
Firstly, the theoretical framework and the research hypotheses will be developed. Then, the 
research methodology will be explained, and the findings of the empirical study will be 
discussed. Finally, we will outline major limitations and perspectives for future research. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
 
Factors affecting the choice between joint ventures and contractual agreements can be 
classified into three main categories: (1) country specific, (2) industry specific and (3) firm 
specific factors. Concerning country specific factors, previous research shows that factors 
such as cultural distance between the firm's home country and the host country (Leung et al. 
2003; Chen and  Hu 2002; Gillespie 2002), institutional aspects such as the progresses in 
market institution building (Meyer, 2001) or the foreign exchange rate and the host country 
currency characteristics (Baek and Kwok, 2002) or the level of environmental uncertainty 
(Lòpez-Duarte and Garcìa-Canal 2002) can play an important role. Industry specific factors 
such as market size, market structure, or the level of industry barriers have also proved 
influential (e.g. Chen and Hennart 2002; Siripaisalpipat and Hosbino 2000). Many authors 
have emphasised the impact of firm specific factors such firm resources and firm size (Leung 
et al. 2003) or the level of international experience of firms (Reuber and Fisher 2003; King 
and Tucci 2002) or the characteristics of CEOs (Herrmann and Datt 2002). 
As far as the theoretical framework is concerned, most available studies have used 
Transaction Cost (TC) economics as their main theoretical framework to analyse the 
determinants of this strategic choice (Brouthers and Brouthers 2003). In the TC view, it is the 
level of uncertainty surrounding market transactions that determines the cost of this specific 
entry mode. TC theorists (Williamson, 1985; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Nakos and 
Brothers 2002) identify two kind of uncertainty: behavioural uncertainty and environmental 
uncertainty with the first referring to the risk of any opportunistic behaviours by partners and 
the second referring to all the risks that are generated by the entry in an unknown country. 
When the perceived risk associated with the new environment is considered as high, firms 
tend to avoid committing resources and to select non-equity entry modes.  
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Recently, several authors have criticised the transaction cost approach pointing to the fact that 
TC analysis only takes into account internal but not external resources that firms have and 
that can lower the transaction costs related to the entry mode choice (Thuy and Quang, 2005). 
This criticism suggests the adoption of complementary approaches to the entry mode dilemma 
such as the institutional perspective (Yiu and Makino, 2002) or the resource-based view 
(RBV). Tse et al. (1997) with regards to the case of investment in China have analysed the 
effects of country-specific, industry-specific, and operation-related factors on market entry 
strategy through either export or licensing or joint ventures or wholly owned-subsidiaries. 
More specifically, their analysis shows how host and home country characteristics are 
important in determining entry mode decisions. With regards to the resources developed by 
firms Davidson (1982), and Anderson and Gatignon (1986) suggest that international 
experience is a resource affecting the governance of foreign transaction since firms with more 
international experience tend to adopt a high equity entry mode. The study conducted by 
Cantwell and Colombo (2000) shows that technological competencies and technological 
similarity between partners are variables that affect the choice between equity and non-equity 
agreements with close technological specialisation leading to greater likelihood of non equity 
arrangements. However, their analysis is limited to the information technology sector and 
lacks observations concerning joint ventures, thus limiting its generalisation. 
Several authors have emphasised the necessity to adopt a more integrated approach when 
analysing the choice between equity and non-equity alliances. For example, Hill et al. (1990), 
and Yiu and Makino (2002) estimate that TC economics offers a useful but only partial 
explanation of the complex phenomenon. More specifically, the TC approach seems well 
suited to interpret the cost effects on firms of the alternative modes of governance but needs 
additional theoretical approaches to fully capture the complexity of the process. In this 
research, we have thus decided to adopt an integrated framework in order to study the alliance 
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mode choice. Combining two approaches that are frequently used in the field, that is 
transaction cost theory and resource based-view, we focus on a few features that are likely to 
affect alliance mode choice, namely industry features, activities of the value-chain involved in 
the agreement and characteristics of the host countries. This last point is of special interest. In 
recent years, a lot of effort has been made to examine the impact of specific factors on entry 
mode decisions and among these factors institutions attracted the most attention. Some 
contributions extended the Transaction Cost theory by adding institutional factors to the given 
framework (Brouthers 2002; Lu 2002). Others argued that institutions modify the uncertainty 
surrounding transactions (Said and McDonald 2002; Meyer 1998). We develop this analysis 
adding some specific variables to the effect of cultural distance. The specific variables 
introduced in our model test the effects of aspects that may affect alliance mode choice, but 
that have not been widely investigated. These effects refer to variables developed in order to 
measure the level of legal rights protection and the level of political risk surrounding foreign 
investments in a country. We first consider several variables proposed by the TC approach 
and then we also take into account variables suggested by the RBV. 
 
In the transaction cost approach, the role of intangible assets is considered as crucial in 
driving firms towards a more hierarchical mode of governance. For example, Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988) and Hennart and Larimo (1998) find a positive relationship between R&D 
intensity and the probability of creating a wholly owned subsidiary rather than a JV. 
Brouthers (2002) underlines how the firms operating in high-technology sectors tend to have 
a higher assets specificity of their investments that leads to higher risk of opportunistic 
behaviours by partners. Therefore, he suggests that TC theory supports the view that more 
integrated modes provide more efficient organisational structures when there is a threat from 
opportunism. We can thus consider that, when firms exchange knowledge, a highly specific 
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asset with a high degree of uncertainty, more integrated forms are preferred. This tendency 
should be stronger in industries where research input is an essential part of the production 
chain and an essential factor in developing a competitive advantage, as it is the case in 
science-based sectors. Therefore we can propose the two following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Firms that form agreements involving R&D functions tend to chose joint ventures rather 
than non-equity alliances. 
H2: In science based industries, firms are more likely to choose joint ventures rather than 
non-equity alliances. 
 
Recent IB literature relying on the works by North (1990) underlines the role that institutional 
features have on corporate strategies. Brouthers et al. (2002) and Meyer (1998) demonstrate 
how institutional characteristics of the host country can impact investment strategies affecting 
the uncertainty involving foreign transactions. More specifically, Brouthers (2002) shows that 
the legal framework can play an important role. Countries where the legal structure is less 
developed and where legal protection for foreign entities is low are perceived as more risky 
by foreign firms. Joint ventures, when associating local partners, allow foreign investors to 
hedge against the political risk of government intervention (Chen and Hennart 2004; Lòpez-
Duarte and Vidal-Suàrez 2008). When entering foreign markets, the legal restrictions and the 
political hazard are considered as sources of risk and this risk can be better hedged with the 
presence of a local partner. Consequently, a high level of risk in the host country favours a 
less hierarchical entry mode. However, this conclusion does not hold in the same way when 
firms evaluate the possibility to enter the market either with an alliance or with a JV. In this 
case, the choice to have a partner in the host country has already been made and the firms 
must evaluate whether to enter the market with an equity stake (JV) or with a non equity 
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agreement. Here, the low level of legal protection and the high level of political hazard are 
sources of risk that increase the transaction costs of the agreements (both equity and non 
equity). In this case, according to TC theory, a more hierarchical form of agreement will be 
preferred thus favouring JV agreements rather than non equity entry modes. Moreover, the JV 
alternative is seen as a stake in a local concern and the presence of a joint investment with a 
local partner is seen as an insurance against possible retaliation by the foreign government. 
We thus suggest two hypotheses on the effects of the legal and political environment on 
alliance mode choice: 
 
H3a The lower the legal protection in a country, as measured by the efficiency of contract 
enforcement, the more likely it will be that firms choose joint ventures rather than non-equity-
alliances. 
H3b The higher the political hazard in a country, the more likely the probability that firms 
choose a joint venture rather than a non-equity alliance. 
 
Despite the increasing globalisation of markets, distance still influences internationalisation 
strategies. More specifically, cultural distance plays an important role when firms decide to 
enter new markets (Erramilli and Rao 1993; Hennart and Larimo 1998). Kogut and Singh 
(1988) argue that differences in culture between home and host countries increase the level of 
risk in integration processes, and thus lead firms to choose less risky agreements. More 
generally speaking, the more distant the culture between home and host countries, the more 
difficult and expensive is the process of adaptation to the new environment for the firm. The 
lack of knowledge increases the cost and the risk of the market entry so most of the scholars 
assume that the larger the cultural distance the lower the preference for internal modes of 
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entry. Therefore, we assume that firms prefer to enter distant markets with a non-equity 
alliance in order to gain knowledge and we posit that: 
 
H4: The higher the cultural distance between the home and the host country, the more likely 
firms will choose non-equity alliances rather than joint ventures. 
 
Recently, several scholars used the resources-based view to interpret entry mode choice 
(Ekeledo and Sivakumar 2004). The two views are not necessarily conflicting as TC focuses 
mainly on the cost of governing foreign transaction while RBV underlines how foreign entry 
is a means to increase firm resource endowments (Meyer et al. 2009b). More generally, the 
RBV underlines how firms choose their entry mode in foreign markets on the basis of both 
the existing resources they control and on the basis of the ones they would like to have access 
to. As argued by Grant (1991), firm size defines the scope of its own resources and what a 
particular firm can and cannot do. It thus reflects available resources. In fact, larger firms, 
which have more resources in terms of managerial and organizational knowledge, will tend to 
look more for complementary resources and less for new knowledge. This will lead large 
firms to prefer equity forms. Conversely, small firms, being limited in the resources that they 
control, will prefer non equity arrangements. Consequently we posit our last hypothesis: 
 
H5 When small firms are involved, it is more likely that they will choose a non-equity alliance 
rather than a JV. 
 
Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework of our research. The model illustrates the possible 
effects of five variables on alliance mode choice: firm resources proxied by firm size, host 
country institutional characteristics, the industrial sector of the agreement, the 
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internationalisation strategy of the firm and the activities of the value chain concerned by the 
agreement.  
 
Figure 1 Factors affecting alliance mode choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Methodology and definition of variables 
3.1 The sample 
The empirical investigation is based on a sample of 879 interfirm agreements concluded by 
Italian firms with partners from all over the world. The observation period extends from 2000 
to 2006. The database, compiled by the authors, covers announced agreements reported in “Il 
Sole 24 Ore”, the main Italian economic newspaper. The collected information has been 
verified through web sources and press releases regarding the firms involved in the 
agreements. Data extracted from the press has frequently been used to identify cooperative 
alliances (Mayrhofer 2004). In our database the percentage of joint ventures is 54%. The 
geographic origin of partner companies is mainly Europe (42%), followed by the United 
States and Canada (20.9%), and China (12%). The industry distribution of the sample is fairly 
 
 JV vs. non-equity alliances 
Firm resources 
Host Country 
characteristics 
Industrial sector 
Internationalisation 
strategy 
Activities of value-chain 
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representative of the Italian industrial and service structure. Firms operating in the traditional 
sectors cover 11% of the sample, scale-intensive firms are 34 %, the energy and utility sectors 
cover 9%, the trade sector 7% and the residual sector (mainly financial and 
telecommunication industries) represents 28% of the total sample. 
 
3.2 The variables 
The variables that have been extracted and used in the model are reported in table 1. The 
dependent variable is the contractual form of the agreement which has been coded 1 if the 
agreement takes the form of a joint venture and 0 if the agreement is a non-equity alliance. 
The variables used in the model concern the following categories: the geographical scope of 
the agreement, the country characteristics of the host country, the size and the industrial sector 
of  the Italian firms and two other firm characteristics namely: the international strategy of the 
firm and the main functional activity concerned by the agreement. 
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Table 1: variable definition 
 
Construct Variable definition and scale 
Hypothesis 
(expected 
sign) 
Variable Name 
Contractual form  JV =1  - Alliance = 0   
 
Nace Sector Code 
 
(Pavitt classification)  
 
Dummy variable 
 
1. Primary activity 
2. Traditional sector 
3. Scale-intensive sector  
4. Specialized suppliers 
5. Science-based sectors 
6. Energy sector , gas and water  
7. Wholesale trade and retail trade 
8. Financial activity communication & other services 
 
 
 
H1 
(-) 
 
 
 
S_primary 1 
S_trad 2 
S_scale 3 
S_spec 4 
S_science 5 
S-enregy 6 
S-trade 7  
S_othersr 8 
 
Value chain activities  
 
involved in the agreement/JV 
 
Dummy variable 
 
 
Dummy variable: 
1. Infrastructure 
2. R&D 
3. Procurement 
4. Logistic  
5. Human resource Management 
6. Production 
7. Marketing and Sales  
 
H2 
(-) 
 
 
 
 
 
Infras 
R&D 
Proc 
Logistic 
HR  
Prod 
Mkting 
Enforcing contracts 
 
From - ∞ to = 0, with 0 = highest level of legal protection 
 
H3a 
(-) 
Enfcon 
 
Political constraints  
 
From 0 to 100 with 100 = low political hazard 
 
-H3b 
(-) 
Costri 
Cultural distance  
 
 
 
 
 
Kogut & Singh index. The index has been adapted to Italy and is 
represented algebraically as: 
CD j    4//
4
1
2



I
iiuij VII

where CDj is the cultural difference of the jth country from Italy, Iij 
represents the index of the ith cultural dimension and the jth country, u 
stands for Italy and Vi is the variance of the index of the ith dimension. 
H4 
(-) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cult_dist 
 
Size of enterprise  
Dummy variable 
<49 employees   Small 
49-499 employees 
H5 
(-) 
Medium 
>500 employees  Large 
  Control Variables    
Credit rating  1-100 (100= high rating grade), OECD data  Rating 
Investor protection index  0-10 (10=high investor protection) (World Bank, doing business 
with database) 
 Invpro 
Global competitiveness index  1-10 with 10 = high global competitiveness (World Economic 
forum) 
 Compet  
Firm strategies  
 
Dummy variable 
 
Risk reduction  
Economies of scale and or rationalization  
Complementary technologies and patent  
Co-opting or blocking competition  
Overcoming government-mandated investment or trade barrier  
Initial international expansion  
Quasi-vertical integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
Scale 
Compl-tech 
Comp 
Barriers 
Int exp 
QV-intergr 
Area destination 
 
 
Dummy variable 
 
1. Western Europe  (EU-15 + Switzerland) 
2. East Europe (rest of Europe) 
3. Russia 
4. United States and  Canada 
5. Latin America  
6. Japan 
7. Cina  
8. India 
9. Rest of Asia 
10. Other countries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area 1 
Area 2 
Area 3  
Area 4  
Area 5  
Area 6  
Area 7  
Area 8 
Area 9 
Area 10 
 
 
The functional content of an alliance represents the activities of the value chain that are 
primarily concerned by the agreement. The activities that have been coded using a dummy 
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variable are: Logistics (Logistic), Operations (Prod.), Sales and marketing (Mkting) with 
regards to the primary activities. The support activities are: Procurement (Proc) Human 
Resource management (HR) Research and Development (R&D) and Infrastructure (Infras) 
i.e. the functions of departments such as accounting, legal, finance, planning, public affairs, 
government relations, quality assurance and general management. The variable sector (Sector) 
defines the main industry sector of the firm promoting the agreement. In order to code the 
industry, we use the NACE nomenclature of economic activities provided by the European 
Commission. Using the well-known Pavitt (1985) taxonomy the NACE codes have been 
recoded. We end up with a total of 8 industrial sector dummy variables: the primary sector, 
the four Pavitt sectors (traditional, scale-intensive, specialised suppliers and science-based 
sectors), the utilities sector (energy gas and water), the trade sectors and a residual sector. 
With regards to the institutional characteristics of the host country we have taken different 
variables into account. The first variable measures the degree of protection of contracts in a 
country (Enfcon). We use an index produced by the World Bank, the Enforcing contracts 
index, that measures the efficiency of the legal system in resolving commercial disputes in a 
country averaging three main indicators: the number of procedures from the moment the 
plaintiff files a lawsuit in court until the moment of payment, the time in days to resolve the 
dispute, and cost in court fees and attorney fees. The index measures the efficiency of contract 
enforcement. In the model, the index has been inserted with a negative sign so that lower 
values of the index correspond to lower values of legal protection and efficiency in contract 
enforcement. The level of political risk in the country has been measured using the political 
constraints index (Costri) developed by Henisz (2000). The index underlines the differences 
between policy systems of different countries measuring the extent to which a given political 
actor is constrained in his or her choice of future policies. We have scaled the index on a 100 
basis so the possible scores for the final measure of political constraints range from zero for 
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the most hazardous countries to 100 for the safest. It must be noted that, since the measure of 
political risk we have used assigns a lower value to the most risky countries, we predict a 
negative relationship between the political risk variable and the entry mode choice: riskier 
countries with a lower value of political constraint index will attract, ceteris paribus, more JV 
than non-equity agreements. The index has been calculated as the average of the values of the 
index over the last five years. The cultural distance measure relies on the usual Hofstede  
(1980) index. However, because most of the studies (Barkema et al. 1996) use a composite 
index we also follow this approach. More specifically, our variables measuring cultural 
distance (Cult_dist) have been constructed on the basis of the Kogut and Singh (1988) index, 
a composite index of cultural distance that is based on the deviation along the first four 
dimensions of Hofstede’s framework and that has been extensively used in the study of 
foreign market entry (Morosini et al., 1998). Following similar empirical studies (Majocchi et 
al. 2005), we proxy the firm resources with the firm size at the time of the agreement. Using 
the numbers of employees, three classes can be defined: small, medium and large firms. The 
smaller group is made up of firms with less than 50 employees, the medium firms have a 
number of employees between 50 and 499 and large firms are those with more than 500 
employees.  
As usual in empirical work, a series of control variables have been introduced. A first dummy 
variable identifies the country of destination in order to catch all the potential host country 
effects not defined in our previous variables. We defined 10 regions as reported in table 1. 
Then we insert an index measuring the level of Investor protection (Invpro). This index is 
computed by the World Bank and measures the strength of minority shareholder protections. 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more investor protection. 
Moreover, in order to identify potential effects caused by different strategies we identify the 
motives behind alliance decisions. This variable has been defined according to the firm goals 
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as stated in the press reports or in the press releases regarding the agreements. In order to 
classify the internationalisation strategy we use the taxonomy proposed by Contractor and 
Lorange (1988). In their landmark work on alliances, they underline the strategic reasons 
behind the choice to develop alliances. According to this taxonomy, each agreement can be 
classified in one of the following cases using dummy variables: 
 Risk reduction (Risk) i.e. product portfolio diversification; dispersion of fixed cost, 
etc.  
 Economies of scale and or rationalization (Scale) i.e. lower cost by using the 
comparative advantage of each partner, etc. 
 Overcoming government-mandated investment or trade barriers (barriers); i.e. to 
operate as a “local” entity because of local partner, etc. 
 Co-opting or blocking competition (Comp); i.e. defensive joint ventures to reduce 
competition or offensive joint ventures to increase costs and/or lower market share for 
a third company, etc. 
 International expansion (Int exp); i.e. benefiting from local partner’s know-how, etc. 
 Complementary technologies and patent (Compl-tech); i.e technological synergy  or 
exchange of patents and territories, etc. 
 Vertical quasi-integration (QV integration); i.e access to technology, labour capital or 
to distribution channels, etc. 
Finally, two other indexes have been inserted as control variables in order to measure the 
overall risk of the host countries: one that measures the economic development of the country 
and one that measures the level of solvency of public finances. The first index the Global 
Competitiveness index (Compet) produced by the World Economic Forum considers a 
collection of factors, policies and institutions which determine the level of productivity of a 
country and that, therefore, determine the level of prosperity that can be achieved by an 
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economy. The index ranges from 0 to 100 with the higher values corresponding to higher 
levels of competitiveness. The second index is an index of financial stability (Rating) and it 
has been taken by OECD. The index is a financial indicator to potential investors of debt 
securities issued by the State. In the context of our analysis it is another measurement for the 
overall financial and economic risk affecting the target country. The variable ranges from 0 to 
100; the higher the rate the better the state of public finances and the lower the overall risk in 
investing in the country. 
 
3.3 The Model 
We test our hypothesis using logistic regression techniques, the standard logit procedures of 
the Intercooled Stata 9 package. Logistic regression is used in order to estimate the incidence 
of the independent variables on the probability that firms will choose either a non-equity 
alliance or a joint venture. Since the variable “agreement” takes the value 0, if partners decide 
to collaborate on a non-equity basis, and 1, if the operation takes the form of joint venture. A 
positive sign of the coefficients indicates that an increase in the value of the independent 
variable will increase the probability that the firm will choose a joint venture rather than a 
non-equity agreement. As usual for group variables, a variable has been dropped in order to 
avoid the dummy variable trap (perfect multicollinearity). The sign of the coefficients for 
these variables should be interpreted with regards to the variable that has been dropped and 
that acts as a reference variable (Greene 2003). The descriptive statistics and the correlation 
coefficients of the variables (dummy variables excluded) are reported in table 2. Data show 
that, given the low value of the correlation coefficients, multicollinearity is not a concern for 
this analysis. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation table 
(dummy variables excluded) 
 
 Mean Std. D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
cult_dist (1) 1.28 .989 1      
Costri     (2) 39.37 14.61 -0.651 * 1     
Compet  (3) 50.77 6.67 -0.624 * 0.544 * 1    
Rating    (4) 94.30 11.81 -0.339 * 0.314 * 0.644 * 1   
Invpro    (5) 6.018 1.61 -0.242 * 0.047  0.396 * 0.238 * 1  
Enfcon   (6) 368.66 220.80  0.001  0.128 *  -0.310 * -0.487 * -0.181 * 1 
* = significant at the 0.01 
 
The results reported in table 3 are those of the general model (model 1) where the coefficients 
of the country variable have not been reported for reasons of simplicity (they are not 
statistically significant). The second model (model 2) is the restricted model where, due to the 
low significance of the coefficients, country ratings and the dummies on the geographical 
areas have been dropped. A likelihood ratio test comparing these two models confirms that 
the reduced model is as relevant as the full model. Overall, the model performs reasonably 
well with significant value of the Chi-square and of the area under the ROC curve and with a 
satisfactory percentage of correctly predicted observations. The low value of the pseudo R-
square is not fully satisfactory but it must be noted that the pseudo-R
2
 is not analogous to the 
R
2
 in linear regression though there is an empirical relationship between the two, and a 
pseudo-R
2
 of 0.2 represents an R
2
 of approximately 0.4 (Hensher et al. 2005). The main 
results are reported in the following table.  
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Table 3 : Logistic regression results:  
 
 Variable name  Model 1 Model 2 
F
u
n
ct
io
n
 m
a
in
ly
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
a
g
re
em
. 
Infras 
.1472 
(.1776) 
.1648 
(.1756) 
R&D 
-.4986** 
(.2175) 
-.5039** 
(.2163) 
Proc 
-.0690 
(.2962) 
-.1021 
(.2913) 
Logistic 
-.2271 
(.2598) 
-.2386 
(.2559) 
Prod 
.9215*** 
(.2047) 
.9487*** 
(.2022) 
Mkting 
-.3879** 
(.1748) 
-.3554** 
(.1722) 
In
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
r 
S_primary 
1.263** 
(.6268) 
1.307** 
(.6184) 
S_trad 2 
.2725 
(.2967) 
.2547 
(.2942) 
S_Scale 3 
0.324 
(.2365) 
.0550 
(.2307) 
S_Spec 4 
.2817 
(.3272) 
.3040 
(.3201) 
S_Science 5 
1.234** 
(.5559) 
1.265** 
(.5519) 
S_energy 6 
.3828 
(.3010) 
.3702 
(.2953) 
S_trade 7 
-.2009 
(.3057) 
-.1822 
(.3025) 
 
Invpro 
-.1110 
(.0821) 
-.0949* 
(.0513) 
 
Enfcon 
-.0004 
(.0007) 
-.0008** 
(.0004) 
 
Costri 
-.0130 
(.0132) 
-.0139* 
(.0077) 
 
Cult-dist 
-.1901 
(.1330) 
-.2038* 
(.1132) 
S
iz
e 
Small 
-.6418 
(.4704) 
-.6100 
(.4642) 
Medium  
-.5298*** 
(.2012) 
-.5156*** 
(.1990) 
    
 
Compet 
-.0529** 
(.0253) 
-.0545*** 
(.0186) 
 
Rating 
.0084 
(.0143) 
- 
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
 s
tr
a
te
g
y 
Risk 
-.1305 
(.2027) 
-.1491 
(.2006) 
Scale 
-.1588 
(.2103) 
-.1813 
(.2065) 
Compl-tech 
-.1532 
(.1900) 
-.1539 
(.1877) 
Comp 
-.1310 
(.1750) 
-.1206 
(.1723) 
Barriers 
-3119 
(.2989) 
-.2107 
(.2747) 
Int exp 
.3770** 
(.1691) 
.3915** 
(.1658) 
 Log-likelihood;  
Chi-square (36, 26) 
Pseudo-R2 
Correctly classified 
Area under ROC curve =  
-540.04403 
132.72 
0.1094 
65.64% 
0.7124 
-543.50815 
125.80 
0.1037 
64.62% 
0.7061 
Notes: (1) The sample consists of 879 observations; (2) For model 1 estimation results 
for the geographical area dummies are not reported in the table for the sake of 
simplicity. None of the variables not reported are statistically significant (3) Standard 
errors are in brackets. The symbol * denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 
10% level, ** 5% level and *** at a 1% level 
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Since the results are robust for both models, we refer our analysis only to the more restricted 
model. The results of the logistic regression analysis provide support for some of our 
hypotheses but not for all of them.  
Hypothesis 1 is not supported by the results of the statistical analysis. The coefficient for the 
dummy variable R&D is significant, but has a negative sign and not, as expected, a positive 
sign. When the R&D function is concerned, firms prefer to use non-equity alliances rather 
than joint ventures. We developed hypothesis 1 on the basis of Transaction cost theory 
considerations. The result of our analysis seems to challenge this view. Our results show that 
uncertainty and the risk of opportunistic behavior can be dealt with by a firm, even with less 
integrated forms that, at the same time, guarantee speed of execution and low costs of 
bargaining. Unfortunately, due to lack of data, we could not consider the kind of knowledge 
that is transferred through the JV or the agreement. Both Meyer et al. (2009a) and Lòpez-
Duarte and Garcìa-Canal (2002) underline how it is the kind of knowledge sought by a firm 
that affects the market entry choice.  
Hypothesis 2 predicting that, in science sectors, firms tend to prefer joint ventures appears to 
be confirmed. Our analysis supports the transaction cost view that asset specificity has a 
positive impact on the choice between hierarchical (equity) and non hierarchical modes of 
governance. From this point of view, our results confirm previous findings (Hennart and 
Larimo 1998; Brouthers 2002) in the new context that we have analysed.  
The same applies to the hypothesis that concerns the level of legal protection and political 
hazard in the target country. Hypothesis 3a and 3b jointly state that, when the legal protection 
in a country is low and political hazard is high, firms prefer to set up a joint venture with a 
local partner in order to have some kind of hedging against political risk. This result is 
statistically significant (even if only in the restricted model) and confirms previous results 
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(Delios and Henisz 2003) regarding the role that the legal and political environment plays in 
affecting firm entry mode choice. Our results suggest that high political risk pushes firms to 
enter foreign markets with an equity form (JV) rather then with a non-equity agreement. 
Considering the control variables, it must be noted that, with the notable exception of the 
rating grade, and even if at a different level, all the indexes that define the host country 
characteristics are significant. This result reinforces the view that economic and political 
features of the host country are important.  
Similarly, the hypothesis regarding the effects of cultural distance on alliance mode choice is 
confirmed (Hypothesis 4), even if only at the 10% level of significance.  
Finally, hypothesis 5 regarding the role of size has the expected sign for both small and 
medium sized firms but it is significant only for the medium sized firm variable. Resources 
seem to be an important determinant of the choice of alliance mode. Prior research tends to 
concentrate only on large firms which have been the main players in the international arena. 
The exploration of small and medium sized firms however seems a promising line of research 
and we think that our results offer some useful insights in this field. Moreover, our findings 
provide further support for the resource-based view that is at the basis of our hypothesis and 
that has increasingly been used in IB research. A more integrated approach that merges TC 
economic with a RBV approach could be a useful staring point for research on cooperative 
alliances. 
 
5. Conclusions, managerial relevance and limitations 
 
This study is an attempt to empirically test the role of five factors on the choice between joint 
ventures and non-equity alliances: firm size, activities of the value-chain concerned by the 
agreement, industrial sector, host country institutional characteristics and cultural distance. 
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Our findings confirm that the factors we have explored do have, at different degrees, an effect 
on this alternative. We refer more specifically to the effect of country risk and legal protection 
on alliance mode choice. In our case the usual conclusion drawn by scholars (Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998), using TC economics, have been reversed. Our findings show that more 
hierarchical modes of entry are preferred when the level of political risk is high. This 
conclusion needs further empirical validation but it suggests that not all the choices in the 
entry mode range follow the same rationale. This result is significant both by the managerial 
and the theoretical point of view. For business practitioners, it means that once a firm decided 
to enter in a new market with a partner this choice is not only affected by efficiency 
considerations, as it is typically assumed in the TC approach, but also by the kind of resources 
available to the firm. Both TC theory and a RBV approach seem to highlight different 
determinants. Consequently, from the theoretical point of view, our results call for a more 
integrated approach that combines the strengths of both theoretical perspectives. Finally, our 
analysis shows that host country characteristics influence the alliance mode choice, but that 
institutional features are also relevant. Further development of this idea seems a very 
promising stream of research.  
Notwithstanding these encouraging results, we are well aware that certain limitations of the 
study should be born in mind. The first limitation is given by the single institutional setting 
that we use. All the firms in our sample are Italian so we could not differentiate firms 
according to the country of origin. We are aware that empirical findings in management are 
usually context specific and that any generalisation out of the specific context is difficult. 
Secondly, we could not control for other factors that are important in the alliance mode 
selection process such as the level of international experience or the degree of 
internationalisation, the intangible intensity and the kind of knowledge transferred through the 
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agreements. Therefore, further analysis of the joint venture - non-equity alliance alternative 
that will include these factors would contribute to a better understanding of this choice.  
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